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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRYAN J. TAVENNER, : Case No. 20070895-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). Appellant Bryan Tavenner was convicted and sentenced for burglary (Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003)), and two counts of transporting/disposing of hazardous waste 
without a permit (Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113(3)(a), (3)(b) (2007)), all third degree 
felony offenses. The judgment of conviction and sentence is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the State failed to present evidence to support that Tavenner made entry 
into a hazardous-waste shed at Pioneer Valley Hospital and intended to commit theft of 
or otherwise transported/disposed of hazardous waste. 
Standard of Review: Where evidence is insufficient, this Court will reverse the 
convictions. A sufficiency issue is reviewed as follows: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We will reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous 
cases). An observation made by this court in Petree bears repeating here: 
[Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this 
Court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment 
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing 
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. 
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, j^ 15, 63 P.3d 94 (citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue is raised under the plain-error doctrine. See_ State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, ^[13,10 P.3d 346. This Court may review a sufficiency claim for plain error to avoid 
injustice. See id. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-
102 and 19-6-113 (2007); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-201 and 76-6-202 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On December 19, 2005, the State filed an information against Tavenner for bur-
glary (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202), and two counts of transporting/disposing of hazar-
dous waste without a permit (icL at § 19-6-113(3)(a), (3)(b)), all third degree felony 
offenses. (R. 1-3 (alleging crimes occurred on March 5, 2005)). On August 3, 2006, the 
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court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound the case over for trial. (R. 36-38). 
Thereafter, the defense filed pre-trial motions to quash the bindover (R. 41-49), 
and to dismiss charges due to the destruction of evidence. (R. 62-77). The trial court 
denied the motions (R. 60-61; 89-90), and on August 14, 2007, it began a two-day jury 
trial. (R. 96-102; 164). On August 15, 2007, the jury rendered guilty verdicts on all 
counts. (R. 104). On October 5, 2007, the trial court sentenced Tavenner to three 
suspended prison terms, with 90 days in jail and 36 months of probation. (R. 144-47). 
On November 2, 2007, Tavenner filed a notice of appeal. (R. 150-51). The appeal is 
timely. See_ Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 (2007). Tavenner is incarcerated on another matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sulieti Lutui monitors security cameras during the graveyard shift at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital. (R. 164:78-79). She testified that in March 2005, monitors showed an 
unidentified car in the south parking lot of the hospital on three occasions. (R. 164:79-81, 
83-84, 85-86, 90, 95-97, 107). According to Lutui, employees use the south parking lot. 
In addition, a hazardous-waste shed, a separate unspecified dumpster, and a loading dock 
are located there. (R. 164:80-82, 106). 
Lutui first noticed the car apparently early in the morning on Thursday, March 3, 
2005. (See R. 164:83-86). The car pulled up, the person looked around, then left. (Id.) 
She saw the car for the second time early on Friday, March 4. (See R. 164:83 (sta-
ting the second observation was March 4, Thursday night going into Friday morning)). 
On that occasion, the person took things from the side of the building or behind the 
hospital, and put them in the car. (R. 164:81-83 (stating the person made three to four 
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trips); see also R. 164:86 (stating, he "parked right across from [the security] camera"); 
164:108). She could not "really say" what the person was taking, and she could not see 
where he was coming from, since he went off camera. (R. 164:81-82). She stated he 
walked toward an area where the hazardous-waste shed and separate dumpster are 
located. (R. 164:81-83, 106). Also, he carried "bags and a box" or "a box and a bag and 
something that looks like a trash can." (R. 164:81-83, 99, 108). Lutui called security. 
(R. 164:83, 108). By the time security arrived, the car was gone. (R. 164:83, 91-92). 
Lutui saw the car for the third time early in the morning on Saturday, March 5. 
(R. 164:86). The person parked "where the [security camera] wasn't at"; he parked 
"[k]indofoffofthe side of the building." (R. 164:87). She indicated on cross-
examination that on March 5, the person loaded items into the car. (See, e.g., R. 164:99, 
100). However, she could not see what he was loading or where he got the items from; 
he was outside the scope of the camera. (R. 164:99; see also R. 164:100 (reporting, "I 
saw him taking things and loading them into his car. I don't know what they were," but 
"it sure looks like he was stealing things")). Lutui called security. (R. 164:92). 
Danny Hughes responded to the call. He arrived as the car was leaving. (See R. 
164:92). He identified the car as a red Dodge Stratus, license plate number "041 MYA." 
(R. 164:112-13; State's Exhibit 8 depicting car)). 
After the car left, Hughes inspected the area and saw damage to the hazardous-
waste shed. (R. 164:113-14, 116-17). "[T]he lock had been broken and the hinges were 
broken, too." (R. 164:113-14). That was the only time Hughes saw damage to the shed. 
(R. 164:116). Hospital employees called West Valley police. (SeeR. 164:132-33). 
4 
Officer Carl Wimmer arrived and observed a tough shed for hazardous waste, and 
a "busted" lock and broken wood where the lock attached to the shed. (R. 164:133; see 
also State's Exhibits 11 and 12). A sign on the shed read, "Caution, infectious waste 
storage area, unauthorized persons keep out." (R. 164:135-36). He also observed 
"garbage cans full of hazardous materials." (R. 164:134). 
Wimmer "concluded that there was a criminal mischief, a vandalism that the shed 
had been busted" (R. 164:133), but he could not conclude burglary or whether "someone 
had actually made entry into the shed." (Id.) Also, Wimmer did not say if he secured 
the shed or sealed it off in any way for further investigation. (See R. 164:132-146). 
Wimmer took the license plate number for the Dodge Stratus from Hughes and ran 
a check to identify the car owner. It was Tavenner. (R. 164:137). Wimmer left the 
hospital and drove past Tavenner's address but did not stop. (R. 164:138). Tavenner's 
address was more than a five-minute drive from the hospital. (R. 164:138-39). 
Later that same day (Saturday, March 5) at approximately 8:00 p.m., state agents 
observed medical waste at a dumpster behind a strip mall at 3398 South 5600 West. (See 
R. 165: 174-75 (stating Kevin Okleberry from the Salt Lake Valley Health Department 
received a call to that address); see also R. 165:175 (reflecting that emergency agencies 
called "someone from the health department" for expert assistance); 165:200-01, 202 
(reflecting that West Valley City police and fire were involved and "on site")). 
Okleberry described items scattered around the dumpster including syringes, 
needles, broken glass and broken vials, gloves, and various pieces of medical waste. (R. 
165:175, 176, 177). "[I]nside the dumpster itself there were sample tubes or vials, blood 
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tubes or vials, containers labeled Mbio-hazardous waste," syringes, a container with 
human blood, tubing with human blood, and other discarded medical waste. (R. 165:175, 
176, 179). Okleberry also described a blood transfusion bag and needles from a suture 
kit. (R. 165:178, 179). He identified the items as bio-hazardous infectious waste, with a 
"significant" or "high potential" of "containing] pathogenic organisms" - such as the 
Hepatitis B virus, the Hepatitis C virus, or the virus that causes AIDS. (R. 165:175, 178-
80; State's Exhibits 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26). 
Okleberry testified that sharp items in the waste could cause injury with infection 
or transmittal of a virus. (R. 165:180,183). Also, he stated that "any type of blood or 
body fluid" or potentially infectious material is presumed infectious under the hazardous-
waste provisions. (R. 165:190-91, 198; see also R. 165:256). 
Okleberry attempted to mitigate and contain the waste in the strip-mall dumpster 
area. He swept the area, sealed off the dumpster and called a disposal company to pick 
up and dispose of the waste. (R. 165:180, 182, 189). 
Okleberry described government regulations for disposing of hazardous waste and 
transporting it. (R. 165:185-88). According to Okleberry, Tavenner did not have a 
permit to transport or dispose of hazardous or infectious waste. (R. 165:187, 189). Also, 
the strip-mall dumpster at 3398 South 5600 West did not have a permit for disposing of 
"bio-hazardous infectious waste." (R. 165:188). 
On March 6, an inspector for the Health Department, Karl Hartman, became 
involved in the investigation of the abandoned waste at the strip-mall dumpster. (R. 
165:230-32). Like Okleberry, Hartman observed an assortment of waste, including vials 
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of various sizes with blood, a culture swab, or other fluids; blood bags; containers; a 
suture kit (R. 165:233, 236, 238, 239, 240); blades with dried blood (R. 165:234, 235); 
containers with blood and tubing (R. 165:235, 236); gloves; medical waste containers; 
bio-hazard bags (R. 165:236); needles; hooks with cords (R. 165:237); an IV bag with 
blood; sharps; and a sharps container. (See also State's Exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 34). According to Hartman, approximately 75 pounds of waste 
had been left in the dumpster area. (R. 165:245). 
Hartman removed vials from the dumpster to record information and to determine 
where they came from. (R. 165:240-41, 249). The first three vials led him to Pioneer 
Valley Hospital. (R. 165:241-43, 250 (reflecting that Hartman preserved the vials in a 
locked box in a freezer at the health department)). Hartman conducted an audit of 
Pioneer Valley in an effort to "make some connections, possibly," as to how the medical 
waste "made its way" to the strip-mall dumpster. (R. 165:243). He reviewed the log for 
the hospital's medical waste and it indicated "the amount[] of waste that [was] going out 
and where it was going, each date indicating that it was going to Steri-Cycle for final 
disposal." (R. 165:243-44). Also, hospital personnel informed Hartman that "the shed 
had been broken into the previous Friday or Saturday." (R. 165:245). 
On March 7, Bryan Christensen arrived at the hospital. It was his job to collect 
linens and hazardous waste throughout the hospital during weekdays. (See R. 165:213, 
224). Christensen described his duties generally in collecting, transporting, and storing 
waste at the hospital. (R. 165:213-222). He did not indicate anything amiss when he 
arrived for his weekday shifts on Thursday, March 3 or Friday, March 4. (See, e.g., id.) 
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When Christensen arrived at the hospital on Monday, March 7, he learned of 
damage to the hazardous-waste shed. (R. 165:219). He could not recall how the shed 
appeared, but he "was able to tell that it had been broken into." (R. 165: 219). He could 
"tell things were removed because of the way [he] had stacked everything in there and 
things get moved around." (R. 165:220,225-26). 
Christensen acknowledged that "somebody else takes care of the waste" on 
weekends, and he acknowledged that someone could have removed/moved items on 
Saturday or Sunday for unloiown reasons. (R. 165:224-26). Christensen described a bar 
code and scanning system for tracking items in the shed. (R. 165:225). He did not say 
whether he checked the scanning system (see R. 165:213-26), and he did not say whether 
hazardous waste was missing from the area. (See R. 165:213-26). 
Sometime later, agents turned the investigation over to Detective William 
McKnight of West Valley City, then to Tawna Stone of the District Attorney's Office. 
McKnight and Stone spoke separately to Tavenner about events at Pioneer Valley 
Hospital on March 5. (R. 164:122-23,148). They both established that Tavenner had 
been in the hospital south parking lot on the 5th. (R. 164:122-23, 148, 149). However, 
Tavenner denied taking waste from the shed. (R. 164:123). 
During McKnight's investigation, he took a picture of Tavenner and showed it to 
Sulieti Lutui. (R. 164:124-25). "[S]he said that she thought that that was the individual 
she - at the night of the break in. I also showed her a picture of the car. She said that 
was the car." (R. 164:125). 
Also, at trial, Stone identified an aerial photo/diagram showing the location of 
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Pioneer Valley Hospital, the strip-mall dumpster, and Tavenner's home. (R. 164:150-51, 
State's Exhibit 14). Significantly, the State made no attempt to tie Tavenner to the strip-
mall dumpster and abandoned waste. (See, e.g., R. 165:193). 
Indeed, there is no evidence that Tavenner was at the strip-mall dumpster, and no 
one asked him about it. (See R. 164:119-31 (McKnight did not indicate he talked to 
Tavenner about the strip-mall dumpster); 164: 147-65 (Stone did not indicate she talked 
to Tavenner about the dumpster); see also 165:268-83 (the prosecutor's cross-examina-
tion)). No one searched or checked Tavenner's car for evidence (R. 164:119-31 (no 
indication that McKnight checked the car for evidence); 164:137-39 (although Wimmer 
had information on the morning of the incident, he did not follow-up with Tavenner); 
164:147-65 (no indication that Stone investigated the car)); and no one indicated finding 
anything that may have belonged to Tavenner at the strip-mall dumpster. Thus, while the 
State presented evidence that Tavenner was at Pioneer Valley Hospital in the south 
parking lot where a hazardous-waste shed and separate unspecified dumpster were 
located (see R. 164:137), and it linked items from the strip-mall dumpster to the hospital, 
the State failed to present any evidence connecting Tavenner or his car to hazardous 
waste or to the strip-mall dumpster. (R. 164:119-31 (McKnight); 164:132-45 (Wimmer); 
164:147-65 (Stone)). 
Nevertheless, at the end of trial, the jury convicted Tavenner of burglary with 
intent to transport/steal hazardous waste, and two counts of transporting/disposing of 
hazardous waste. (R. 104; 122; 128; 132; 165:323-24). This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State charged Tavenner with one count of burglary, where it claimed he made 
entry into a hospital hazardous-waste shed with the intent to transport or to commit theft 
of hazardous waste; and it charged Tavenner with two counts of transporting/disposing of 
hazardous waste. Tavenner maintains the evidence was insufficient to support the 
charges. Specifically, the State failed to present evidence that Tavenner made entry into 
the hospital shed for the burglary count. In addition, for all three counts, the State was 
required to establish Tavenner's connection with hazardous waste. However, the 
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict failed to support burglary with 
intent to commit theft of or to transport hazardous waste; and it failed to make any 
connection between Tavenner and hazardous waste for the separate charges under Utah's 
hazardous waste act, Section 19-6-113. Where the evidence was insufficient for the three 
counts, Tavenner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT TAVENNER 
COMMITTED BURGLARY AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CRIMES. 
A. THE SUFFICIENCY STANDARD. 
Tavenner has raised a sufficiency issue. For such an issue, this Court has stated 
the following: 
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. Smith, 927 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Harman, 161 P.2d 567, 568 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See_ id/, State v. Vessey, 
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "We view the evidence in a light most 
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favorable to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), 
and "will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harmon, 767 P.2d at 568 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the 
burden is high, it is not impossible. See_ id_ "We will not make speculative leaps 
across gaps in the evidence." Id_ (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State 
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
Smith, 927P.2dat651. 
State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, If 10, 2 P.3d 954; see also Holzate, 2000 UT 74, f 
18; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, If 17, 993 P.2d 232. 
Historically, Utah courts have required a defendant raising a sufficiency claim to 
'"marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.1" State v. Boyd, 2001 
UT 30,113, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^[14, 989 P.2d 1065; 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)); see also Harding v. Bell, 
2002 UT 108, Tf 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (stating the party contesting the verdict must assume 
the role of "devil's advocate"); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating proper marshaling requires appellant to present "in compre-
hensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array 
of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence"). 
Recently the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "When conducting a sufficiency of 
the evidence review, it is the duty of the reviewing appellate court to perform its 'review 
in the context of the whole record, or at least that portion of the record to which its 
11 
attention [is] drawn by the appellant's marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to 
the appellant's marshaled evidence.'" State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ^ 24, 167 P.3d 1074 
(citing S.B.D. v. State (State ex rel Z.D.), 2006 UT 54, ^ 39, 147 P.3d 401). 
According to the court, "a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry ends," icLdX^ 26, if 
there is evidence for all requisite elements of the crime, whether it is brought to the 
court's attention by way of marshaling or by way of appellee's brief. See_ id_?&\ 24. 
With respect to the evidence, Utah courts have ruled evidence may be sufficient 
for upholding the verdict even if it is contradictory or conflicting. That is, the mere 
existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 784 (Utah 1991). Indeed, it is the function of the jury to weigh and assess 
conflicting evidence and "to determine the credibility of the witnesses.u Boyd, 2001 UT 
30, Tj 16 (emphasis in original; citations and internal quotations omitted); see also State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) ("When the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and 
the weight to be given particular evidence" (cite omitted)); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1213 (Utah 1993) (stating credibility is an issue for the jury); State v. Cravens, 2000 UT 
App 344, \ 18, 15 P.3d 635 (stating "it is the province of the trier of fact" to determine 
which testimony to believe and what inferences to draw from the facts). 
"So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences" to support the 
necessary elements of the crime, a reviewing court will not disturb the jury's decision. 
See Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 16. The court will '"assume that the jury believed the evidence 
supporting the verdict.'" Id_ at j^ 14 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1213); see also State v. 
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Colwell 2000 UT 8,1j 42, 994 P.2d 177; State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, If 30, 989 
P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 
'assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict'" (cite 
omitted)). 
In addition, it is well settled that '"a conviction can be based on sufficient 
circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997)). '"Circumstantial evidence need 
not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury 
in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.'" 
Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 
(Utah 1986)); see also State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ffif 62-64, 152 P.3d 321 (considering 
circumstantial evidence for conviction); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991). If 
circumstantial evidence is presented, this Court must determine whether "the inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human 
experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting Workman, 852 P.2d at 985); James, 819 P.2d at 
789 (stating "intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence"). 
However, if a verdict is based on inferences that give rise to "speculative 
possibilities of guilt," it is not legally valid. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting Workman, 
852 P.2d at 985). Also, a reviewing court will not indulge "inference upon inference" or 
worse, "inference upon assumption." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (internal quotes and cites omitted), affd, State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 
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911. It will not take "speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Gonzales, 2000 UT 
App 136, If 10 (cite omitted). Rather, it is the function of a reviewing court to ensure 
"that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a 
jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. 
Merila, 966 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal emphasis omitted) (quoting 
James, 819 P.2d at 784; State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)). 
As set forth below, the State failed to present evidence that Tavenner entered the 
hospital shed and intended to transport or to commit theft of hazardous waste for a 
burglary count. Also, it failed to present evidence to support that he otherwise 
transported and/or disposed of such waste for violations of Utah's hazardous waste act. 
Thus, the convictions here should be reversed. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CHARGED OFFENSES. 
1. For the Convictions at Issue Here, the State Was Required to Establish 
Tavenner's Connection to Hazardous Waste. 
The State pursued three charges against Tavenner. The first charge was for 
burglary. According to Section 76-6-202, "[a]n actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit" a 
theft or any felony offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(l)(a), (l)(b). Statutory law also 
defines the phrase "enters or remains unlawfully," and it defines M[e]nter." It states, 
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public 
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the 
premises or such portion thereof. 
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I± § 76^6-201(3); i± at § 76-6-201(4) (defining "[e]nter" to mean "[intrusion of any part 
of the body" or "[ijntrusion of any physical object under control of the actor"); see also 
State v. Gallezos, 2007 UT 81, \ 12, 171 P.3d 426 (stating a court will construe criminal 
statutory provisions according to their plain meaning). This Court has stated, 
Under these provisions, to sustain a conviction for burglary, the evidence must 
show the defendant was in the building unlawfully, without license or privilege, 
with the intent to commit theft. To be guilty of theft, however, a person must only 
"obtain [ ] or exercise[ ] unauthorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof." Id_ § 76-6-404. Thus, if the State does not prove 
an unauthorized entry or remaining, a defendant may not be found guilty of 
burglary but nevertheless may be convicted of theft. See, e.g., State v. Pitts, 728 
P.2d 113, 115-16 (Utah 1986) (per curium). 
State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981) (stating "[t]he elements of the crime of burglary are: (1) the 
act of entering the building, and (2) the specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or 
assault therein"), overruled on other grounds as recognized in West v. Holley, 2004 UT 
97, U 16 n.2, 103 P.3d 708; State v. Syddall 433 P.2d 10, 11 (Utah 1967) (stating the 
"gravamen" of burglary "is the entry into a building or other enclosure mentioned in the 
statute with a specific intent to commit larceny or some other felony"). 
In this case, the State maintained that on March 5, 2005, Tavenner entered/re-
mained in a shed at Pioneer Valley Hospital "with the intent to commit a theft or the 
felony of Unlawful Transport of Hazardous Waste." (R. 122). The State made no attempt 
to distinguish between "theft" of hazardous waste and the "felony" of transporting waste. 
(R. 104; 122; 124-25; 165:304-05). Thus, for the burglary count, the State was required 
to show that Tavenner made actual entry into the shed and he did so with the intent to 
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take/transport waste. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-201(3), (4); 76-6-202(1 )(a), (l)(b). Here, 
the evidence failed to support the charge; the conviction cannot be sustained. 
In addition, the State charged Tavenner with two counts of transporting/disposing 
of hazardous waste on March 5. Section 19-6-113(a) defines the offenses as follows: 
(3) On or after July 1, 1990, no person shall knowingly: 
(a) transport or cause to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed 
under this part to a facility that does not have a hazardous waste operation plan or 
permit under this part or RCRA; 
(b) treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this 
part: 
(i) without having obtained a hazardous waste operation plan or permit as required 
by this part or RCRA; 
(ii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a hazardous 
waste operation plan or permit; or 
(iii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any rules or 
regulations under this part or RCRA; 
(4)(a)(i) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of Subsection (3)(a) or 
(b) is guilty of a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113 (emphasis added). For the crimes of transporting/disposing 
of hazardous waste, the State was required to establish that Tavenner transported hazar-
dous waste or caused such waste to be transported, and he disposed of it without a permit. 
Id. Also, § 19-6-102 defines hazardous and infectious waste. IdL at § 19-6-102(9), (12). 
Tavenner does not dispute that the State presented evidence of hazardous or 
infectious waste. Rather, he maintains the evidence presented at trial failed to connect 
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him to hazardous waste. Thus, the convictions under Section 19-6-113(3)(a) and (3)(b) 
cannot be sustained. 
2. The Marshaled Evidence Failed to Establish the Crimes. 
The State called several witnesses to testify at trial. For purposes of this appeal, 
Tavenner has separated the witnesses into three groups. The first group observed 
suspicious events early on March 5 in the south parking lot at Pioneer Valley Hospital in 
the area of a hazardous-waste shed and a separate unspecified dumpster (Lutui, Hughes, 
Wimmer, Christensen). Their evidence would support that Tavenner took unidentified 
items from the area, and he was in the area of the damaged shed. (See infra. Argument 
B.2.(a), herein). However, the evidence failed to support that he made entry into the 
shed, or that he intended to transport or steal hazardous waste from the area. Also, there 
is no indication from this record that hazardous waste was missing. (See infra, id.) 
The second group of witnesses investigated Tavenner and events at the hospital 
shed (McKnight, Stone). Their evidence placed Tavenner in the south parking lot. (See 
infra, Argument B.2.(b), herein). Finally, the third group of witnesses investigated waste 
at a strip-mall dumpster (Okleberry, Hartman). The State made no effort to connect the 
waste at the strip-mall dumpster to Tavenner. (See infra. Argument B.2.(c), herein). 
(a) The First Set of Witnesses Described Damage to the Hazardous-Waste Shed. 
Notably, the Evidence Failed to Support that Tavenner Went Inside the Shed and 
Intended to Take and/or Transported/Disposed of Waste; Also, the Evidence 
Failed to Support that Hazardous Waste Was Missing From the Area. 
Evidence from the first group of witnesses - those who observed suspicious events 
in the hospital's south parking lot - failed to establish that Tavenner entered the 
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hazardous-waste shed, and it failed to establish that hazardous infectious waste had been 
taken from the property, transported, or disposed of. Specifically, Sulieti Lutui did not 
claim to see any person enter the shed or handle hazardous waste. (See, e.g., R. 164:99). 
Lutui testified that she monitors security cameras at Pioneer Valley Hospital. (R. 
164:78-79). In March 2005, cameras showed an unidentified car in the south parking lot 
of the hospital on three occasions. (R. 164:79-81, 83-86, 90, 95-97, 107). A hazardous-
waste shed, separate dumpster, and loading dock are in that lot. (R. 164:80-82, 106). 
Lutui first noticed the car early in the morning on Thursday, March 3, 2005. (See 
R. 164:83-86). The car pulled up, the person looked around, then left. (Id.) 
She saw the car for the second time early in the morning on Friday, March 4. (See 
R. 164:83). On that occasion, the person took things from the side of the building or 
behind the hospital, and put them in the car. (R. 164:81-83 (stating he made three to four 
trips); see also R. 164:86 (stating, he "parked right across from [the security] camera"); 
164:108). Lutui could not "really say" what the person was taking, and she could not see 
where he was coming from, since he went off camera. (R. 164:81-82). She stated he 
walked toward an area where the shed and a separate unspecified dumpster are located. 
(R. 164:81-83, 106). Also, he carried "bags and a box" or "a box and a bag and 
something that looks like a trash can." (R. 164:81-83, 99, 108). Lutui called security. (R. 
164: 83, 108). By the time security arrived, the car was gone. (R. 164:83, 91-92). 
Lutui saw the car for the third time early in the morning on Saturday March 5. (R. 
164:86). The person parked "where the [security camera] wasn't at"; he parked "[k]ind 
of off of the side of the building." (R. 164:87). Lutui indicated on cross-examination that 
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on March 5, the person loaded items into the car. (See, e.g., R. 164:99, 100). However, 
she could not see what he was loading or where he got the items from; he was outside the 
scope of the camera. (R. 164:99; see also R. 164:100 (reporting, "I saw him taking things 
and loading them into his car. I don't know what they were," but "it sure looks like he 
was stealing things")). Lutui called security. (R. 164:92). Danny Hughes responded. He 
arrived as the person in the car was leaving. (See R. 164:92; see also R. 164:111, 115). 
Hughes was the second witness to testify. (R. 164:109). He did not claim to see 
anyone in the shed or anyone handle hazardous waste on March 5. (See R. 164:118). 
Hughes recorded the car license plate. (R. 164:111-12). And he observed damage 
to the lock on the hazardous-waste shed. (R. 164:113-14). According to Hughes, he had 
patrolled the area earlier and it was secure. (R. 164:114, 117). "The only time [he] saw 
damage [to the shed] was after [he] responded to that incident" on March 5. (R. 164:114). 
Hughes did not indicate if the door to the shed was opened or closed. (See R. 164:113). 
Hughes's testimony and Lutui's testimony together would support that on March 5, 
Tavenner's car was in the hospital south parking lot; he took unidentified items; and he 
was in the area of the damaged shed. However, the evidence failed to support that 
Tavenner made entry into the shed and it failed to support that Tavenner intended to take 
or transported hazardous waste from the area. See_ Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(4) 
(defining entry); (see also R. 164:118 (stating Hughes did not see anyone break into the 
shed or load items into the car)).1 
1
 In this case, the State relied on a particular theory for burglary. It claimed 
Tavenner entered/remained inside the shed with intent to transport or to commit theft of 
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After Hughes discovered the damaged lock on the shed, he contacted West Valley 
City Police. Wimmer responded. (SeeR. 164:132-33). Wimmer observed the broken 
lock and hinge. (R. 164:133; see also R. 164:135 (stating that sign on the shed read, 
"Caution, infectious waste storage area, unauthorized persons keep out")). Wimmer 
considered there to be a vandalism or criminal mischief, but he otherwise did not come to 
any conclusion about the matter. (R. 164:133). When he looked inside the shed, he saw 
"garbage cans full of hazardous materials." (R. 164:134). 
Also, Wimmer asked employees at Pioneer Valley Hospital if they kept an inven-
tory of items in the shed. (R. 164:142). He was told they did. (Id.) He asked for the 
inventory, but no one gave it to him, and he did not follow-up with the hospital for the 
information. (R. 164:142-43). In addition, there is no indication that Wimmer secured or 
hazardous waste. (R. 104; 122; 124-25; 165:304-05). Since the evidence failed to support 
burglary under that theory, the conviction cannot be sustained. (Argument B., herein). 
In the event this Court nevertheless determines that evidence supported a jury 
conviction on an alternative theory or offense, Section 76-1-402(5) governs. It states that 
if an appellate court determines there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction "for 
the offense charged," but there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an 
included offense, the appellate court may remand the case for entry of a conviction on the 
included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003); see also, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-206 (2003) (stating a person is guilty of criminal trespass if, "under circumstances 
not amount to burglary," he enters/remains on property unlawfully and he intends to 
cause annoyance or damage). Thus, where permitted by law, this Court may order 
remand for a remedy under Section 76-1-402(5). See also Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring 
due process in criminal proceedings); Utah Const, art. I, § 10 (ensuring a defendant the 
right to be tried by a jury); Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (ensuring a defendant the right to 
counsel and the right to know the nature of the accusation against him at trial). 
In addition, under early Utah law, where evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction, an appellate court could remand for a new trial. See State v. Nichols, 145 
P.2d 802 (Utah 1944); State v. Kinsey, 11 Utah 348, 295 P. 247 (Utah 1931). It should be 
noted that the double jeopardy provisions preclude successive prosecutions for the same 
offense. See, e.g., Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (protecting a criminal defendant against double 
jeopardy); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-403, 77-l-6(2)(a) (2003). 
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contained the hazardous-waste shed at the hospital that morning for further investigation. 
As part of his investigation, Wimmer noted information about the car and traced it 
to Tavenner. (R. 164:137). Wimmer left the hospital and drove by Tavenner's address. 
(R. 164:138). He did not see the car and he did not stop. (Id.) Also, he did not follow-up 
to further investigate Tavenner or the car. (See R. 164:138-39). 
On Monday March 7, Bryan Christensen arrived at the hospital. It was his job to 
collect linens and hazardous waste throughout the hospital during weekdays. (See R. 
165:213, 224). He described his duties generally in collecting and transporting medical 
waste to the shed and storing it "until the company comes and picks" it up. (R. 165:217; 
see also 165:213-222). 
Christensen did not indicate that anything was amiss on Thursday March 4, or 
Friday March 5, when he worked his weekday shift at the hospital. Also, he maintained 
someone else at the hospital "takes care of the waste" during the weekends. (R. 165:224). 
When Christensen arrived at the hospital on Monday March 7, he learned that 
someone had damaged the shed. (R. 165:219). "[I]t happened on Friday or Saturday 
[March 5], and I was off that weekend, so I was made aware of it Monday when I had 
come to work." (Id.) He could not "remember the state" the shed "was in," but he was 
able to tell "it had been broken into." (Id.) 
Also, Christensen could tell "things were removed because of the way I had 
stacked everything in there and things get moved around." (R. 165:220). He did not say 
what had been removed/moved (R. 165:213-226); and he acknowledged that items from 
the shed could have been removed/moved during the weekend for unknown reasons. 
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(See also R. 165:225-26 (stating he could tell items were taken, but did not know why)). 
Finally, Christensen described a bar code scanning system for tracking items in the shed. 
(R. 165:225). He did not say whether anyone had checked the scanning system for 
missing items. (See R. 165:213-26). 
In short, State witnesses - who observed damage to the lock on the shed and/or 
events on Saturday March 5 - did not establish that anyone made unlawful entry into the 
shed; they did not establish that anyone took or attempted to take hazardous waste from 
the shed; and they did not specify what, if anything, was missing from the area. (See R. 
164:78-108 (Lutui); 164:109-118 (Hughes); 164:132-45 (Wimmer); 165:213-226 
(Christensen)). Indeed, the evidence supported only that unidentified items were taken 
on March 5 (see R. 164:99, 100). Also the evidence supported damage to the lock on the 
shed. (See supra, note 1, herein). 
Based on this record, the evidence failed to support that Tavenner was inside the 
shed, or that he intended to transport or take hazardous waste from the shed for burglary. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (defining burglary); id § 76-6-201(3), (4) (defining 
"enters or remains"; and defining "[e]ntry"); SyddalU 433 P.2d at 11 (stating the 
"gravamen" of the offense of burglary "is the entry into a building" and a "specific intent" 
to commit theft or to commit some felony). In addition, the evidence failed to support 
that Tavenner transported or disposed of hazardous waste for crimes under Utah's 
hazardous-waste act, Section 19-6-113(3). 
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(b) The Second Set of Witnesses Investigated Tavenner. Notably, Evidence 
Presented by Those Witnesses Failed to Support that Tavenner Entered the Shed 
or that He Intended to Take, Transport, or Dispose of Hazardous Waste. 
Next, evidence from the second group of witnesses - those who investigated 
Tavenner - failed to establish that he made entry into the shed and it failed to establish 
that he intended to take, transport or dispose of hazardous waste. Specifically, Detective 
William McKnight testified that on or about March 17, he read a report about the hospital 
shed(R. 164:120), and the report led him to Tavenner. (R. 164:121, 128). 
McKnight spoke to Tavenner and told him that a "video surveillance" recorded 
him "breaking into a shed stealing hazardous waste." (R. 164:123). (But see R. 164:82, 
87, 88-89, 99, 101; 165:286-88, Exhibit 35 (Lutui stated the monitor and freeze frames 
did not capture events at the shed; in addition images on the "video" and freeze frames 
were unclear, jumpy, grainy, and foggy, and images on her monitor at the hospital were 
clearer)). Tavenner denied the accusation. (R. 164:123). However, he acknowledged 
that he was at the hospital in the south parking lot. (See R. 164:122-23). 
Also, McKnight was in contact with officials from the health department about 
waste that agents found at a dumpster behind an Albertsons and shops at a strip mall. (R. 
164:130-31). McKnight did not review the health department report about the waste at 
the dumpster, and he did not connect it in any way to this case or to Tavenner. (R. 
164:130-31). He did not ask Tavenner about the waste or the dumpster at the strip mall, 
and he did not search Tavenner's car for any information. (See R. 164:119-31). Instead, 
McKnight turned the case over to the District Attorney's office. (See R. 164:130, 131). 
The investigator for the District Attorney's office, Tawna Stone, called Tavenner 
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on May 16. (R. 164:148). Tavenner provided evasive and conflicting answers to her 
questions. (R. 164:148-49, 158). Notwithstanding, she established that Tavenner was in 
the south parking lot of the hospital on or about March 5. (R. 164:148-49, 158). 
Also, she met with Tavenner in person at his parents' home in July. (R. 164:149). 
He acknowledged parking on the south side of the hospital (R. 164:149-50), that is, 
where the hazardous-waste shed and separate unspecified dumpster are located. (See R. 
164:82, 87, 105-06). 
Stone used an aerial photo to identify the location of Tavenner's home, the hos-
pital, and the strip-mall dumpster where agents discovered hazardous waste. (R. 164:150-
52; State's Exhibit 14). She testified that agents were able to link waste from the strip-
mall dumpster to Pioneer Valley Hospital. (R. 164: 160-61). However, no effort was 
made to link waste to Tavenner. (See R. 164:160-65). There is no indication that Stone 
asked Tavenner about hazardous waste at the hospital or at the strip-mall dumpster; there 
is no indication that she searched Tavenner's car for information. (See R. 164:147-66). 
In short, State witnesses who investigated Tavenner did not establish that he made 
entry into the shed, and they did not establish that he intended to take, transport, or dis-
pose of hazardous waste. (SeeR. 164:119-31 (McKnight); 164:147-65 (Stone)). The 
evidence failed to support burglary and it failed to support crimes under § 19-6-113(3). 
(See also supra, Argument B.2.(a)). 
(c) The Third Set of Witnesses Investigated Hazardous Medical Waste at a 
Dumpster Behind a Strip Mall. Notably, Evidence Presented by Those Witnesses 
Failed to Support a Connection Between Tavenner and the Waste. 
Finally, evidence from the third set of witnesses - those who investigated hazar-
24 
dous and infectious waste abandoned at a strip-mall dumpster - failed to establish a link 
between Tavenner and hazardous or infectious waste. Specifically, Okleberry testified 
that on March 5, West Valley agencies dispatched him to a strip-mall dumpster at 3398 
South 5600 West. (See R. 165:174-75 (stating Okleberry received a call to that address); 
see also R. 165:175 ("emergency agencies" called "the health department" for expert 
assistance); 165:200-01, 202 (West Valley City Police and Fire were involved and "on 
site")). He observed abandoned waste at the dumpster. (R. 165:175-79). The waste was 
considered to be infectious and hazardous. (R. 165:175, 179-80, 183, 191, 198; see also 
165:175-79; State's Exhibits 15,21-24,26). It did not belong there. (SeeR. 165:190). 
Okleberry described government regulations for disposing of and transporting 
hazardous waste. (R. 165:185-88). Also, he stated Tavenner did not have a license to 
transport/dispose of hazardous waste (R. 165:187, 189), and the dumpster at 3398 South 
5600 West did not have a permit for disposing of such waste. (R. 165:188). 
Karl Hartman was also dispatched to the strip-mall dumpster. He observed infec-
tious and hazardous waste. (R. 165:233-40; State's Exhibits 16-20, 22-25, 27-29, 34). 
He considered there to be 75 pounds of waste in the strip-mall dumpster. (R. 165:245). 
Hartman checked some of the waste and linked it to Pioneer Valley Hospital. (R. 
165:240-43, 249, 250). Also, he reviewed the log for the hospital's medical waste. The 
log indicated "the amount[] of waste that [was] going out and where it was going, each 
date indicating that it was going to Steri-Cycle for final disposal." (R. 165:244). 
While witnesses linked waste from the strip-mall dumpster to Pioneer Valley 
Hospital, no evidence linked waste from the strip-mall dumpster to Tavenner. (See also 
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R. 165:318 (where the prosecutor acknowledged the State had no witnesses for linking 
Tavenner to the abandoned waste at the strip-mall dumpster; instead, he claimed to have 
"virtually an unbroken chain" of evidence) (emphasis added)). 
Indeed, there is no evidence that Tavenner or his car was seen at the strip mall; no 
evidence that items belonging to Tavenner were intermingled with the waste at the 
dumpster; and no evidence that anyone asked Tavenner about the strip mall, the dumpster 
there, or the abandoned waste. (See R. 164:119-31 (McKnight); 164:147-66 (Stone); 
165:268-83 (Tavenner's cross-examination at trial); see also supra, pp. 18-26, herein). 
This Court has ruled that when reviewing a sufficiency claim, M[w]e will not make 
speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence. Every element of the crime charged must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the 
State has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, \ 10 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
Here the State's evidence supported that on March 5, Tavenner was in the hospital 
south parking lot where a hazardous-waste shed and a separate unspecified dumpster are 
located. (See R. 164:80-109 (Lutui); 164:111-118 (Hughes); 164:120-23 (McKnight); 
164: 137-39 (Wimmer); 164:147-66 (Stone)). Tavenner took unidentified items from the 
area. (R. 164:99-100). After he left, witnesses observed damage to the lock on the shed. 
(R. 164:112-118 (Hughes); 164:133 (Wimmer)). 
Also, the evidence supported that agents discovered abandoned waste in a strip-
mall dumpster blocks from Tavenner's home. (R. 165:175-83 (Okleberry); 165:232-240 
(Hartman)). And it supported that some of the abandoned waste came from Pioneer 
26 
Valley Hospital. (R. 165:241-43,250). 
However, no evidence supported that Tavenner made entry into the shed; no 
evidence supported that he intended to take or dispose of hazardous waste from the shed; 
no evidence supported that Tavenner carried hazardous-waste items from the area; and no 
evidence linked Tavenner to the waste at the strip-mall dumpster. (See Argument B.2., 
herein). The evidence failed to support the conviction for burglary (see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (defining burglary as an unlawful entry or remaining in a building with intent 
to commit theft or a felony)); and it failed to make any connection between Tavenner and 
infectious hazardous waste for the hazardous waste crimes (see Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
113(3) (stating it is unlawful to knowingly transport/dispose of hazardous waste without a 
permit)). Without more, the evidence supported only that Tavenner took unidentified 
items from the parking lot, and he was in the area of the damaged shed. (See supra, note 
1, herein.) 
The convictions for burglary and hazardous waste crimes were based on 
speculation and assumptions. That is insufficient. A reviewing court "will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go." Shumway, 2002 UT 124, f^ 15 (cite omitted). 
However, it will "take special care to ensure that our review of the evidence does not 
encourage the indulging of 'inference upon inference,1 or, worse, the indulging of 
inference upon assumption." Layman, 953 P.2d at 791. Since the convictions here were 
based on speculation, assumptions, and "inference upon inference," Tavenner respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse them. 
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C. THIS COURT MAY CONSIDER THE SUFFICIENCY ISSUE UNDER THE 
PLAIN-ERROR DOCTRINE. 
In State v. Holmte, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346, the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether a defendant must specifically move to dismiss a charge in the trial court to pre-
serve a sufficiency issue for appeal. The court stated, "As a general rule, claims not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." JW. at j^ 11. Also, "the preser-
vation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant 
can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." IcL 
The court in Holgate, specified that the preservation rule serves two purposes. 
First, '"in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" IcL (cite omitted). 
Second, the defendant "should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
fails, ... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse.'" IcL (cite omitted). 
In this case, this Court may decide the sufficiency issue raised on appeal under the 
plain-error doctrine. 
The plain error exception enables the appellate court to "balance the need for 
procedural regularity with the demands of fairness." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
122 n.12 (Utah 1989). "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to 
avoid injustice." \State v. Eldredze, 713 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989).] To demon-
strate plain error, a defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
#o/gafe,2000UT74,t l3. 
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The first prong of plain error is met based on a review of the record. Specifically, 
the evidence presented at trial fails to support that Tavenner made entry into the shed and 
intended to commit theft of hazardous waste or to transport hazardous waste for the 
burglary conviction; and it fails to make any connection between Tavenner and hazardous 
waste for the convictions under Section 19-6-113. (See supra, Argument B., herein). 
Thus, error exists. 
Under the second prong of the analysis, the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court: The trial court is charged with knowing the law and applying it. See_ Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.B.(2) (2007) (stating a judge shall apply the law and 
maintain professional competence). In this case, the law applicable to the charges was 
available and should have been obvious to the court. See_ Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 
(defining burglary); 19-6-113(3) (defining hazardous waste crimes). 
In addition, the trial court presided over the trial. Thus, the facts would have been 
obvious to the trial court. (See R. 164; 165 (reflecting active participation in the trial by 
the court)). Where the facts and the law would have been obvious to the trial court, it was 
error for the court to allow the counts for burglary and hazardous waste crimes to go to 
the jury. (See supra, Argument B., herein); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2003) 
(stating when it appears to the court that the evidence is insufficient to put a defendant to 
his defense, the court shall order him to be discharged); Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 17. 
With respect to the prejudice prong for plain error, where evidence is insufficient, 
the convictions are erroneous and the verdict is not sustainable. Prejudice is self-evident: 
Tavenner has been unjustly convicted of three felony offenses based on inadequate 
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evidence. (See supra, Argument B., herein). To ensure that the verdict is not unlawful, 
this Court should review Tavenner's claim of insufficient evidence. 
This Court may reach the merits of Tavenner's sufficiency claims under the plain-
error analysis. The interests identified in Holgate are served. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
Tj 11 (stating a trial court "ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error 
and, if appropriate, correct it"; and a defendant should not be allowed to forego an 
objection in order to enhance his strategy if he is convicted). Specifically, the error here 
was obvious and fundamental. (See supra, Argument B., herein). Thus, it should have 
been apparent to the trial court that the felony offenses could not be supported. Since the 
error was obvious, the trial court should have addressed it at trial and corrected it. See_ 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3. 
In addition, Tavenner has not realized any benefit by foregoing an objection to the 
insufficient evidence in the trial court. If anything, the delay has been to Tavenner's 
detriment. He has been sentenced on the offenses, even where the evidence is 
insufficient. The lack of an objection in the trial court and in the context raised on appeal 
has not enhanced Tavenner's chances of prevailing on appeal; rather, it has forced him to 
raise the issue under the plain-error doctrine, and it has served to delay a decision that 
should have been made in the trial court. Where this Court is able to review the record 
and apply the law, it may consider the sufficiency claims here for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant Bryan Tavenner respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the convictions in this case for insufficient evidence. 
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SUBMITTED this ML 
day of , March 2008. 
LirMa M. Jones 
Catherine Lilly 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN J TAVENNER, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051909072 FS 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: October 5, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: SKINNER, JACEY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LILLY, CATHERINE E 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 13, 19 81 
Audio 
Tape Number: 79 Tape Count: 1008 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition; 08/15/2007 Guilty 
2. TRANSPORT HAZARDOUS WASTE W/OOT A PERMIT 
- Disposition: 08/15/2007 Guilty 
3. TRANSPORT HAZARDOUS WASTE W/OUT A PERMIT 
- Disposition: 08/15/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
3rd Degree Felony 
3rd Degree Felony 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to•an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TRANSPORT HAZARDOUS WASTE 
W/OUT A PERMIT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
PriBon. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case Ho; 051909072 
Date: Oct 05, 2007 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TRANSPORT HAZARDOUS WASTE 
W/OUT A PERMIT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TRANSPORT HAZARDOUS WASTE 
W/OUT A PERMIT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 90 day(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended; $0,00 
Surcharge: $472.31 
Due: $1000.00 
Total Fine: $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge; $472.97 
Total Principal Due: $1000.00 
Plus Interest 
Attorney Fees Amount: $500,00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
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Case No: 051909072 
Date: Oct 05, 2007 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 90 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1000.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole, 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
"Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole , 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
The defendant is to serve 90 days in jail forthwith. 
The defendant is to obtain a mental health, substance abuse, and a 
vocational evaluation and complete any treatment recommended. 
The defendant is to pay fine $1,000 ^nd recoupment fee of $500 thru 
AP&P. 
The defendant is to pay restitution $nd the amount remains open for 
90 days. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102 (2007) 
19-6-102. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Board" means the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board created in Section 
19-1-106. 
(2) "Closure plan" means a plan under Section 19-6-108 to close a facility or site at 
which the owner or operator has disposed of nonhazardous solid waste or has treated, 
stored, or disposed of hazardous waste including, if applicable, a plan to provide 
postclosure care at the facility or site. 
(3) (a) "Commercial nonhazardous solid waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility" 
means a facility that receives, for profit, nonhazardous solid waste for treatment, storage, 
or disposal. 
(b) "Commercial nonhazardous solid waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility" 
does not include a facility that: 
(i) receives waste for recycling; 
(ii) receives waste to be used as fuel, in compliance with federal and state 
requirements; or 
(iii) is solely under contract with a local government within the state to dispose of 
nonhazardous solid waste generated within the boundaries of the local government. 
(4) "Construction waste or demolition waste": 
(a) means waste from building materials, packaging, and rubble resulting from 
construction, demolition, remodeling, and repair of pavements, houses, commercial 
buildings, and other structures, and from road building and land clearing; and 
(b) does not include: asbestos; contaminated soils or tanks resulting from remediation 
or cleanup at any release or spill; waste paints; solvents; sealers; adhesives; or similar 
hazardous or potentially hazardous materials. 
(5) "Demolition waste" has the same meaning as the definition of construction waste 
in this section. 
(6) "Disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or 
placing of any solid or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that the waste or 
any constituent of the waste may enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or 
discharged into any waters, including groundwaters. 
(7) "Executive secretary" means the executive secretary of the board. 
(8) "Generation" or "generated" means the act or process of producing nonhazardous 
solid or hazardous waste. 
(9) "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste or combination of solid wastes other than 
household waste which, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or 
infectious characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality 
or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a 
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when 
improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed. 
(10) "Health facility" means hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, home health agencies, 
hospices, skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, intermediate care facilities 
for the mentally retarded, residential health care facilities, maternity homes or birthing 
centers, free standing ambulatory surgical centers, facilities owned or operated by health 
maintenance organizations, and state renal disease treatment centers including free 
standing hemodialysis 
units, the offices of private physicians and dentists whether for individual or private 
practice, veterinary clinics, and mortuaries. 
(11) ''Household waste" means any waste material, including garbage, trash, and 
sanitary wastes in septic tanks, derived from households, including single-family and 
multiple-family residences, hotels and motels, bunk houses, ranger stations, crew 
quarters, campgrounds, picnic grounds, and day-use recreation areas. 
(12) "Infectious waste" means a solid waste that contains or may reasonably be 
expected to contain pathogens of sufficient virulence and quantity that exposure to the 
waste by a susceptible host could result in an infectious disease. 
(13) "Manifest" means the form used for identifying the quantity, composition, origin, 
routing, and destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from the point of 
generation to the point of disposal, treatment, or storage. 
(14) "Mixed waste" means any material that is a hazardous waste as defined in this 
chapter and is also radioactive as defined in Section 19-3-102. 
(15) "Modification plan" means a plan under Section 19-6-108 to modify a facility or 
site for the purpose of disposing of nonhazardous solid waste or treating, storing, or 
disposing of hazardous waste. 
(16) "Operation plan" or "nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan" 
means a plan or approval under Section 19-6-108, including: 
(a) a plan to own, construct, or operate a facility or site for the purpose of disposing of 
nonhazardous solid waste or treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste; 
(b) a closure plan; 
(c) a modification plan; or 
(d) an approval that the executive secretary is authorized to issue. 
(17) "Permittee" means a person who is obligated under an operation plan. 
(18) (a) "Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, sludge, including sludge from a 
waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility, or 
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous 
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, or agricultural operations and 
from community activities but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic 
sewage or in irrigation return flows or discharges for which a permit is required under 
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, or under the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 
U.S.C., Section 1251,etseq. 
(b) "Solid waste" does not include any of the following wastes unless the waste causes 
a public nuisance or public health hazard or is otherwise determined to be a hazardous 
waste: 
(i) certain large volume wastes, such as inert construction debris used as fill material; 
(ii) drilling muds, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, 
development, or production of oil, gas, or geothermal energy; 
(iii) fly ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and flue gas emission control waste 
generated primarily from the combustion of coal or other fossil fuels; 
(iv) solid wastes from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and 
minerals; or 
(v) cement kiln dust. 
(19) "Storage" means the actual or intended containment of solid or hazardous waste 
either on a temporary basis or for a period of years in such a manner as not to constitute 
disposal of the waste. 
(20) "Transportation" means the off-site movement of solid or hazardous waste to any 
intermediate point or to any point of storage, treatment, or disposal. 
(21) "Treatment" means a method, technique, or process designed to change the 
physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any solid or hazardous 
waste so as to neutralize the waste or render the waste nonhazardous, safer for transport, 
amenable for recovery, amenable to storage, or reduced in volume. 
(22) "Underground storage tank" means a tank which is regulated under Subtitle I of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 6991, et seq. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113 (2007) 
19-6-113. Violations — Penalties — Reimbursement for expenses. 
(1) As used in this section, "RCRA" means the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq. 
(2) Any person who violates any order, plan, rule, or other requirement issued or 
adopted under this part is subject in a civil proceeding to a penalty of not more than 
$13,000 per day for each day of violation. 
(3) On or after July 1, 1990, no person shall knowingly: 
(a) transport or cause to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed under 
this part to a facility that does not have a hazardous waste operation plan or permit under 
this part or RCRA; 
(b) treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this part: 
(i) without having obtained a hazardous waste operation plan or permit as required by 
this part or RCRA; 
(ii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a hazardous 
waste operation plan or permit; or 
(iii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any rules or 
regulations under this part or RCRA; 
(c) omit material information or make any false material statement or representation in 
any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, operation plan, or other document 
filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with this part or RCRA or any rules 
or regulations made under this part or RCRA; and 
(d) transport or cause to be transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste 
identified or listed under this part and required by rules or regulations made under this 
part or RCRA to be accompanied by a manifest. 
(4) (a) (i) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of Subsection (3)(a) or 
(b) is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted 
of a felony under Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for 
each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years, or both. 
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection 
(3)(a) or (b), the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the term of 
imprisonment authorized in Subsection (4)(a)(ii). 
(b) (i) Any person who knowingly violates any of the provisions of Subsection (3)(c) 
or (d) is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted 
of a felony for a violation of Subsection (3)(c) or (d) is subject to a fine of not more than 
$50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years, or 
both. 
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection 
(3)(c) or (d), the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the imprisonment 
authorized in Subsection (4)(b)(ii). 
(c) (i) Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, or disposes of any 
hazardous waste identified or listed under this part in violation of Subsection (3)(a), (b), 
(c), or (d), who knows at that time that he thereby places another person in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily injury is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted 
of a felony described in Subsection (4)(c)(i) is subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 
or imprisonment for a term not to exceed 15 years, or both. 
(iii) A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental instrumentality, upon 
conviction of violating Subsection (4)(c)(i), is subject to a fine of not more than 
$1,000,000. 
(5) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (5)(b) and (c) and Section 19-6-722, all 
penalties assessed and collected under authority of this section shall be deposited in the 
General Fund. 
(b) The department may reimburse itself and local governments from monies collected 
from civil penalties for qualifying extraordinary expenses incurred in qualifying 
environmental enforcement activities. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 78-3-14.5, the department may 
reimburse itself and local governments from monies collected from criminal fines for 
qualifying extraordinary expenses incurred in prosecutions for violations of this part. 
(d) The department shall regulate reimbursements by making rules that define: 
(i) qualifying environmental enforcement activities; and 
(ii) qualifying extraordinary expenses. 
(6) Prosecution for criminal violations of this part may be commenced by the attorney 
general, the county attorney, or the district attorney as appropriate under Section 17-18-1 
or 17-18-1.7 in any county where venue is proper. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (2003) 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, 
trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of 
persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises 
or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003) 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in 
the building. 
